Following on from the publiciation of my CEP essay a couple of months back, I am publishing my 1st essay from International Relations in my undergraduate degree. I may add that this was one of the few essays where I did exceptionally well i.e. I got higher than a B2 for it. .

The question posed related to How (if at all) and in what ways has the National Security Strategy of September 2002 acted to change United States foreign policy? I may add that this was comoposed in Nov. 2003, so the information does not reflect the National Security Strategies of the second half of the Bush Administration, nor that of the current President Obama.

The National Security Strategy was launched on September 20^th 2002. Among its preamble is one of its central aims ‘..to defend peace…[and] to preserve the peace’[1]. However in the days and months, which followed, this document generated mixed reactions across the globe. The Guardian is quoted as saying that the national security strategy ‘is arrogant patronising, complacent, amazingly presumptuous-but above all aggressive’[2] In contrast to the mainly predominately negative views to the NSS, The Economist ran an article which stated bluntly that the NSS ‘expounds no new ideas and does not change the focus of America’s foreign policy’[3]. This view by The Economist is the view that this author accepts and will argue during the course of this essay. The NSS has not acted to change US foreign policy in any great shape or form. Instead it merely makes US foreign policy more pronounced and thus more controversial. This essay’s argument will take an analytical view of the NSS of September 2002 and compare it to the previous NSS, most notably ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’ of 1996 and ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’ of 1997. It will look at the reaction to the document from the point of view of Naom Chomsky, Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst at the Centre for Defence Intelligence in Washington, The Economist and various other articles, which relate to the topic. In this way the credibility of the document will be examined. This essay will also look at the key actors behind the development of the document, most notably the views of Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz and the Chief of Staff to the Vice-President, I. Lewis Libby. Also examined will be the ideologies that they possess and how this has affected the context of the NSS of 2002. The final aspect that will be looked at is how US foreign policy has reacted since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. All this is necessary to show how US foreign policy has not been affected by the publication of the NSS of 2002, but rather has made it more pronounced in its theory.

The NSS of September 2002 is a very clear and blunt document. Of its nine areas covered, the central themes which emerge are (i) The US has ‘unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence in the world’[4] (ii) promotion of freedom and democracy: ‘We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy…to every corner of the world’[5] (iii) a ‘with us or against us’ stance: ‘We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them’[6] and (iv) the development of co-operative actions with other powers, which are mentioned in part VIII of the document. Also arising out of this document is the enshrinement of pre-emptive strike or preventive war. This is an interesting aspect of the document and as Ikenberry points out that ‘the United States now claims a right to use pre-emptive or preventive force’[7]. While this is not necessarily a new aspect US foreign policy, as The Economist notes U.S. pre-emptive action in Central America[8], pre-emptive action has now moved to a central role in its foreign policy doctrine. Despite this the NSS reaffirms US foreign policy rather than provide for any new ideas. The response to the document from The Economist, as has been mentioned was rather blunt. It states in its article that:

‘it is driven by changing circumstances, notably the Soviet collapse and America’s resulting pre-eminence’[9]

Marcus Corbin, CDI Washington focuses initially on the ‘preventive force’ aspect of the document. He argues that there will be a ‘boomerang effect’[10] if nations, outside the U.S. adopt this policy on a multilateral basis. ‘Could India be justified in striking Pakistan? What will Russia justify doing? China?’[11]. He argues that ‘if implemented unilaterally on controvertible evidence, and with little regard to the ramifications for the international order, it will likely backfire’[12]. In his conclusion to the document, Corbin argues that the NSS of 2002 sets goals for the U.S. but that it remains to be seen if the U.S. will follow it[13]. In his article entitled There’s Good Reason to Fear US, Naom Chomsky argues that ‘the world has good reason to watch what is happening in Washington with fear and trepidation’[14] as the ‘most powerful state in history announced a new National Security Strategy, asserting that it will maintain global hegemony permanently’[15].

The National Security Strategy of September 2002 has not acted to change U.S. foreign policy but instead it has merely made it more pronounced. By comparing the NSS 2002 to that of Clinton’s NSS of 1996 ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’ and 1997 ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’, the three documents can be seen to have some similarities as well as the obvious difference of ‘pre-emptive action’ in the NSS 2002. This view is also put forward by The Economist, which states ‘In some respects, the document has reassuring continuities with President Clinton’s world view, though the Bush White House would hate any such comparison’[16]. The preface of the NSS of 1996 bears an uncanny resemblance to the opening of the NSS 2002. Both state that WMD[17] ‘represent(s) a major challenge to our security’[18]. Both emphasis that the U.S. has an ‘unequalled and unparallel strength and influence in the world’[19]. Both documents react to U.S. interaction with other nations in a region-by-region account. The difference in both documents is the stance held in the NSS of 1996 regarding NATO and the NSS 2002 stance. NSS 1996 is overwhelmingly positive about U.S. involvement in NATO and speaks about greater co-operation on a multilateral basis. However NSS of 2002 is the opposite. It argues that NATO need to reform itself and modernise before it can be a true military force again.

‘if NATO succeeds in enacting these changes, the rewards will be a partnership as central to the security and interests of member states as was the case during the Cold War’[20]

It does encompass a multilateral aspect and it is similar to the NSS of 1997. The NSS 2002 dedicates six sections to dealing with the issue of multilateralism, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI, Part VII, and Part VIII. It states that ‘the United States should invest time and resources into building international relationships’[21]. Whilst the recent war in Iraq is largely perceived as a bi-polar activity between the U.S. and the United Kingdom, it had over 80 members who actively supported the U.S. going into Iraq. However the multilateral aspect of the NSS 2002 is largely ignored. This is partly due to the track record of the U.S. and its willingness to engage in unilateral action such as in Haiti in 1994-95, when U.S. interests are threatened. Haiti is, according to Dumbrell unique in that it is not described as a ‘backlash’ state but because of its problems it was necessary to act unilaterally[22]. Another example of this would be the speech made by Bill Clinton to the UN in 1993 that the US would act ‘multilaterally when possible, but unilaterally when necessary’[23]

Whilst looking at the NSS 2002, it is necessary to look at who is behind their construction and what their ideological stances are. In analysing these people, the bluntness of the document becomes apparent and this shows us how the NSS 2002 has not changed U.S. foreign policy but merely made it more pronounced. The most ‘influential –and most vilified—member of the Bush administration’[24] is Paul Wolfowitz. He is the Deputy Secretary of Defence and was involved in the Bush Snr. Administration as ‘undersecretary of Defence for Policy’. His ideological background is in neo-conservatism, which seeks to ‘restore authority and the nation’[25]. It sees authority as ‘guaranteeing social stability’[26]. However as with the inter-paradigm debate between Realism and Liberalism, Neo-conservatism’s ideological opposite is permissiveness[27]. Wolfowitz ‘s views revolve around the notion of ‘pre-emptive action’, which is seen in the NSS 2002. It is argued that Wolfowitz is not a true ‘hawk’ but rather he is an idealist[28]. The second contributor to the NSS 2002 of importance is I. Lewis Libby, who currently is the Chief of Staff to Dick Cheney. Lewis again is a neo-conservative alongside Wolfowitz and has held views regarding ‘pre-emptive action’. Both he and Wolfowitz drew up the 1992 Draft Defence Policy, which argued as the NSS 2002 does for the US to ‘actively deter nations from aspiring to a larger regional or global goal’[29]. Again both have signed the Project for a new American Century, alongside other neo-conservatives and hawks including Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Elliot Abrams, Peter Rodman and Zalmay Khalilzad[30] who now serve in the current administration. This document appears to have its foundations in the 1992 Draft Defence Policy[31]. The third and in this author’s view most important actor regarding the development of the NSS 2002 is that of Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush. It is argued by The Economist that the National Security Strategy 2002 is the beginning of a new style of ‘Rice’ doctrine[32]. The content of an article that she wrote for Foreign Affairs in January/February 2000 regarding the ‘building of good relations between great powers’[33] shows this. However what is quite interesting about this article, is the key priorities she sees in order for the United States to refocus itself on the national interest.

‘(i) to ensure that America’s military can deter war, project power and fight in defence of its interests if deterrence fails.

(ii) to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles.

(iii) to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies.

(iv) to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with big powers, particularly Russia and China

(v) to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of WMD’[34]

The interesting thing regarding these points is that Rice’s points have all made it into the National Security Strategy 2002. The NSS 2002 focuses in particularly on building on current relationships with Russia and China in Part VIII. The Economist classifies Ms. Rice’s points as ‘classic real-politik’ and there is some truth in this statement. By building up multilateral relationships across the globe, the United States under the Bush administration is following on from the Clinton administration. In so doing, the United States will be somewhat guaranteed support for ventures of reform and to ‘preserve..peace’ in the international arena. Also as has been pointed out, the Wolfwitzian/Libby idea of ‘pre-emptive action’ is tied in alongside these ideas. In doing so, it will be able to continue its foreign policy, which the NSS 2002 has not acted to change but has made U.S. foreign policy more pronounced.

The National Security Strategy of 2002 has not changed the course of the United States’ foreign policy but has made it more pronounced. Since the Post 1945 period, six traits have determined the course of US foreign policy. (i) Interventionist activity (ii) containment (iii) multilateral action (iv) economic foreign policy (v) democracy promotion (vi) United States sovereignty. Since the collapse of the Cold War, the policy of containment and intervention into a specific state has become harder to justify. The Cold War left the United States as the only ‘Superpower’ yet with the collapse of the Soviet Union several smaller, more troublesome ‘rogue states’ started to emerge, which left these policies somewhat redundant. The United States moved to adopt a more multilateral role during the Clinton years of the 1990s that gave it a ‘saintly glow’[35]. However as has been stated it was willing to let this fall to the wayside when necessary. With the ascent of George W. Bush, as president in 2001 the ideals behind multilateralism have been decreased in importance but have nonetheless still remained a factor in his administration, as David D. Caron puts it ‘there does not appear to be evidence that the hostility of the Bush administration to multilateralism has changed or evolved over the first half of the term’[36]. Condoleezza Rice argues that that this attachment to multilateralism which is necessary in the current World Order, should also include the ability for the United States to participate in alliances which makes these multilateral agreements better for the national interest.

‘So multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. U.S. interests are best served by having strong alliances and can be promoted within the U.N. and other multilateral organisations as well as through well-crafted international agreements.’[37]

The Clinton administration’s willingness to sign up to international agreements that were subsequently withdrawn from by the Bush administration, most notably the Kyoto Protocol partly shows its economic multilateralism. Condoleezza Rice stated that ‘a treaty which does not include China and exempts ‘developing’ countries from tough standards while penalizing American Industry cannot possibly be in America’s national interest’[38]

To Conclude, the National Security Strategy of 2002 has not impacted on the course of United States foreign policy but rather, as has have argued made U.S. foreign policy more pronounced. In the course of this essay, the argument has been made that the National Security Strategy of 2002 compares in numerous ways to the NSS of 1996 ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’ and ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’ of 1997.However as has been show the difference in the NSS of 2002, is the pre-dominant role that is given to ‘pre-emptive action’ alongside the necessity in the document for increased international co-operation and increased humanitarian roles for contries. Also looked at, to show how its main contributors Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby and most importantly Condoleezza Rice have influenced the document. In the final parts of the essay, the focus was on the differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations especially the critique by Condoleezza Rice regarding the conduct of multilateral arrangements and how they should be accompanied by strong alliances. In essence the National Security Strategy of 2002 is a blueprint for a continued US foreign policy based around multilateralism, but as has already been stressed this is nothing new. It is merely a reaffirmation of what was already know.

Bibliography

Books

• Barber, B. R. (2003) Jihad vs. McWorld London: Round House Group
• Baylis, John and Steve Smith (2001) The Globalisation of World Politics (2e) Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Caridi, R.J. (1974) 20^th Century American Foreign Policy London: Prentice-Hall International Inc.
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• Mealanson, R.A. (1996) American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War New York: St. Martin’s Press
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• Caron, D.D. (2003) Between Empire and Community; The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment in Berkeley Journal of International Law; 2003, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p395, accessed http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=10459311&db=buh 2/12/2003
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• Chomsky, N. (2003) There’s Good reason to Fear US in Toronto Star 8 September 2003 accessed http://www.countercurrents.org/us-chomsky080903.htm 8/12/2003
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• Cienski, Jan (2003) Wolfish stance put to the test: Paul Wolfowitz in National Post May 24, 2003 Saturday National Edition section; World pp A11 accessed from http://www.lexisnexis.com (Major World Newspapers) 2/12/2003
• Congressional Research Service (2002) The USA PATRIOT ACT: A Sketch accessed http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/rs21203.pdf 4/12/2003
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• Corbin, M. (2002) The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step accessed http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/washington.cfm 20/11/2003
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• Economist, The (2003) Economic and financial Indicators in The Economist Vol.369 Issue 8353. 6/12/2003 p96-97
• Economist, The (2003) Greatest danger/Greatest hope; Survey: America in The Economist Vol.369 Issue 8349 section: Centre-Page Supplement

• Hirsh, M. (2003) Bush and the World in Foreign Affairs Vol.81 No.5 September/October 2003
• Ikenberry, G.J. (2002) America’s Imperial Ambition in Foreign Affairs Vol.81 No.5 September/October 2002
• Leffler, Melvyn P. (2003) 9/11 and the past and future of American foreign policy in International Affairs Vol. 79 No.5
• Rice, C. (2000) Promoting the National Interest in Foreign Affairs Volume 79 No.1 January/February 2000
• Simes, D.K. (2003) America’s Imperial Dilemma in Foreign Affairs Vol.82 No.6 November/December 2003
• Talbott, S. (2003) War in Iraq, revolution in America in International Affairs Volume 79, 5
• Whitehouse (1996) A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement accessed http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.html 20/11/2003
• Whitehouse (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America accessed http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf 20/11/2003
• Whitehouse (1997) A National Security Strategy for a New Century accessed http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy 20/11/2003
• Zoellick, R.B. (2000) A Republican Foreign Policy in Foreign Affairs Volume 79 No.1 January/February 2000

Websites

• 1992 Draft Defence Policy Guidance accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/govt/1992draft_body.html 3/12/2003
• Profile: I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/libby/libby.html 3/12/2003
• Profile; Paul Wolfowitz accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/wolfowitz/wolfowitz.html 3/12/2003

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[1] Whitehouse (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America accessed http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf 20/11/2003

[2] The Guardian, (2002) America’s Way accessed from http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4507300-103682,00.html 8/12/2003

[3] The Economist (2002) Unprecedented Power, colliding ambitions Vol.364 Issue 8292 28/9/2002

[4] NSS 2002 pp1

[5] Preamble NSS 2002 pp2

[6] NSS 2002 pp5

[7] G. John Ikenberry, (2002) America’s Imperial Ambition in Foreign Affairs Vol.81 No.5 September/October 2002 pp51

[8] The Economist (2002) Unprecedented Power, colliding ambitions 9/28/2002

[9] Ibid

[10] Marcus Corbin, (2002) The Bush National Security Strategy: A First Step accessed http://www.cdi.org/national-security-strategy/washington.cfm 20/11/2003

[11] Marcus Corbin Op. cit

[12] Marcus Corbin Op.cit

[13] Marcus Corbin Op.cit

[14] Naom Chomsky, (2003) There’s Good reason to Fear US in Toronto Star 8 September 2003

[15] Naom Chomsky Op.cit

[16] The Economist (2002) Unprecedented Power, colliding ambitions 9/28/2002

[17] Weapons of Mass Destruction

[18] Preface NSS 1996

[19] NSS 2002 pp1

[20] NSS 2002 pp26

[21] NSS 2002 pp9

[22] John Dumbrell, (1997) American Foreign Policy London: Macmillan Press Ltd. pp188-189

[23] Naom Chomsky, (2000) Rogue States: The Rule of force in international relations London: Pluto Press

[24] Cienski, Jan (2003) Wolfish stance put to the test: Paul Wolfowitz in National Post May 24, 2003 Saturday National Edition section; World pp A11

[25] Heywood, A. (2002) Politics (2e) Hampshire: Palgrave pp 50

[26] Ibid pp50

[27] Ibid pp50

[28] Profile; Paul Wolfowitz accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/wolfowitz/wolfowitz.html 3/12/2003

[29] Profile: I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/libby/libby.html 3/12/2003

[30] Profile; Paul Wolfowitz accessed http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/wolfowitz/wolfowitz.html 3/12/2003

[31] Ibid

[32] The Economist (2002) Unprecedented Power, colliding ambitions 9/28/2002

[33] Ibid

[34] Condoleezza Rice,  (2000) Promoting the National Interest in Foreign Affairs Volume 79 No.1 January/February 2000 pp46-47

[35] Naom Chomsky, (2000) Rogue States: The Rule of force in international relations London: Pluto Press

[36] Caron, D.D. (2003) Between Empire and Community; The United States and Multilateralism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment in Berkeley Journal of International Law; 2003, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p397

[37] Condoleezza Rice,  (2000) Promoting the National Interest in Foreign Affairs Volume 79 No.1 January/February 2000 pp47-48

[38] Condoleezza Rice,  (2000) Promoting the National Interest in Foreign Affairs Volume 79 No.1 January/February 2000 pp48