Politics Essays: Central European Politics – 2003

I am going back over my old essays from my undergraduate degree…Some of them are a little bit dated now, but I figured I may as well post some of them now considering they are only sitting on my HDD not doing much.

The course was my Comparative European Politics module in U.L. and it was spread across the following themes: the emergence of European nation states; the so-called European model of liberal-democratic government; cleavages and cleavage structures; economic and welfare systems; processes of public policy-making; party families and party systems; electoral systems; the parliamentary system of government and alternative representative forms of democracy; executive leadership and presidentialism across Europe; the role of bureaucracy, courts and constitutions; transition to democracy in Southern Europe and an in-depth country-study; dynamics of Europeanisation and opposition to ‘Europe’; ‘new’ politics, new social movements and new ways of understanding developments across Europe. The title of the essay is listed below

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Essay Title: To what extent have parliaments, executives and courts developed new roles in recent decades?

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The countries of the world have had to adapt to the ever-changing world, however the countries of Western Europe have seen a higher increase in the need for new departments, offices, commissions, tribunals etc, in order to deal with the new roles that they have acquired. In order to look at the extent to which parliaments, executives and courts have developed new roles in recent decades, it is necessary to define what ‘recent decades’ is. For simplicity and this essay, I have chosen the period of the 1960s up until the present time to mean ‘recent decades’

This period has seen many cultural and political changes such as for example, the rise and subsequent fall of the Eastern ‘Bloc’, which included communist East Germany. It takes into consideration, almost the entire period of the Cold War between the U.S. and Russia, and how Europe was used to each of the superpowers benefit. Also this period saw the rise of youth politics and youth radicalisation, as seen with the 1968 Paris Riots, when students rose up against the old order of de Gaulle’s Government[1]. This also led to more vocal viewpoints on contentious political issues such as feminism, environmentalism and anti-war movements. However for the purposes of this essay it is necessary to tie down specific countries and link their parliaments, executives and courts to new roles, which they have adopted. In this essay the focus will be on four western European countries- France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Also it is necessary to look at the political structures that were in place in these countries in the 1960s. Spain was under a military dictatorship of General Franco but was changed to a constitutional monarchy under King Juan Carlos II in 1978. Germany had been split in the late 1940s into ‘a liberal democratic order in West Germany and a soviet-style communist regime in the Eastern part of the country.”[2]. As it exists today, it is a unified federal republic. France exists today as a Presidential democracy, as it did in the 1960s. Finally Italy was a liberal democracy in the 1960s and still is today. The role of the European Union will also be looked at and how it has had an influence on the development of new roles for Parliaments, Executives and Courts.

The parliaments of the four countries are all unique in their operation but have some similarities. France’s 1958 constitution weakened the Parliamentary system. In France however it does give provisions, for the operation of the Parliament. It has the power to control government but not enough power to destroy or supplant executive power[3]. There is a separation of executive and legislative power with Parliament having responsibility for two areas:

“Parliament determines the rules on a range of specified subjects, which include fundamental liberties, civil status and civil rights, liability to taxation, conscription, penal procedures and electoral laws. It also lays down the general principles and the framework of law…The detailed implementation of which is left to the Government”[4]

 

Any area outside of this, is dealt with by the executive and importantly constitutional issues cannot be dealt with by the French Parliament, as is pointed out by Wright;

“The constitutional restriction…represents the most important single breach of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty”[5]

 

In contrast, the Bundstag’s approval is required for any federal or constitutional bill, in Germany. Similarly as in France, it has a control mechanism on the executive through ‘parliamentary committee of inquiry, the organisation of parliamentary hearings and legislative initiatives of the Bundstag as a whole or of a group of deputies”[6]. It can also employ the power of a ‘vote of no confidence’ to keep the executive body in check, as the Federal Chancellor has not got the power to dissolve Parliament. The Italian Parliamentary structure has in the past been quite strong. Prior to the 1990s chaos, the committee structure had become so powerful that it was able to bring in its own laws without a full parliament being present[7]. Spain’s Parliamentary system is still taking shape, as Michael Newton puts it, from ‘1977, the reformed Cortés slowly began to acquire the lost habits of Parliamentary democracy’[8]. Its constitution allows the Parliament control over legislature and fiscal approval.  It also has a say on constitutional issues via the Constitutional Court; 8 of its 12 members are appointed by the Parliament[9]. Also Parliament has three constitutional controls over government, which are as follows (1) right to government presence in Cortés (2) Right to question the government (3) Right to Information relating to the state.[10] This would appear to make Spain’s Parliament quite strong, however Gallagher disagrees stating the ‘the Cortés is not seen as one of Europe’s most significant parliaments.[11]’

As all the above show the parliamentary structure in each of these three countries is quite different however each have had to develop roles in order to meet new problems. All of these countries are members of the European Union. The strength of these Parliaments, with the exception of Germany all depends on what roles National Parliaments are prepared to adopt and how they are constitutionally able to do so. Most European parliaments will act as a debating chamber for European policies and how they will affect that specific country. E.g. In Spain, there have been debates over the reduction of the conservation area off the west coast of Ireland, known as the ‘Irish box’, which was a part of their original entry conditions when Spain joined in the Cortés.

As has been seen most of the countries outlined have a weak parliamentary system but with the vast majority having some control over the executive. As such the executive will be looked at now and examined to see what new roles have been developed in recent years.

France’s system of executive control rests in a direct election of a President, who in turn nominates a senior legislator to head a cabinet[12]. Usually this is a member of his or her own party but not always, as was the case from 1993-1995 when Francois Mitterand, the Socialist French president was forced to ‘co-habit’ with Jacques Chirac the right-wing President of National Assembly[13]. The President has five basic functions, according to Vincent Wright: to be ‘the ceremonial head of state, the guardian of the national interest, the foundation head of patronage, the country’s most prominent politician and finally the head of the executive.[14]’

In contrast, the German Federal President is subordinate to that of the Federal Chancellor, which currently is Gerhard Schroeder. In Manfred Schmidt’s view the Federal President has two roles: guardian to ceremonial functions and a potential mediator in the event of a crisis[15]. The federal Chancellor determines and is responsible for general policy guidelines in domestic and foreign affairs. He has the ability to nominate/dismiss ministers but must get Presidential approval. He also gains the power over the armed forces in times of national emergencies[16].

These executives have had to adapt to new conditions while still maintaining the constitutionality of their office. As Gallagher puts it:

 

“All this means that while the formal powers of the prime minister are typically laid down in the constitution, the real power of almost all European prime ministers flows from practical politics as much as explicit rules.[17]

 

In the period leading up to the unification of East and West Germany, the executive of the Federal Republic were faced with the integration of five new states, which only enjoyed 30-40% of the wealth that was in F.R.G. states[18]. Schmidt argues that this unification has seen the F.R.G. having to adapt to a new style of Federalism, which is stronger than before[19]. Similarly as in France, the problem of racism has been constant but in recent decades it has appeared again in more force. In the 1980s, the Mitterand executive sought to integrate immigrants into French society and remove racism. The replacement of differing work and residential permits for differing nationalities with one single permit[20] shows how the French executive were able to adapt a new role in order to face up to the problem of racism.

The final focus in this essay will be on the roles that European National Courts systems have had and how they have had to adapt to new roles for special instances but also how some have conceded their right to supremacy in their country to the European Court of Justice. The first example is Spain. Her court system is split into five divisions with the Supreme Court at the top. These divisions are as follows: civil, criminal, social, military and administrative[21]. Spain’s Constitutional Court is able upon the request of 50 deputies or 50 senators to review laws[22]. Of its twelve members, eight are appointed by the Parliament, two by the executive and two by an organisation that represents Spanish Judges[23]. It accepts alongside France the supremacy of the European Court of Justice. France’s Court system is divided in to three (1) Constitutional (2) Administrative and (3) Civil and Criminal. The Constitutional Council is a highly politicised organ of the French judicial system. Of its members, the President, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate all nominate three candidates[24]. It has a limited scope because it examines what it is sent and not what it likes. It analyses how Treatises, increasingly European ones fit in with the Constitution. The other divisions of the judiciary is less politicised with the Council of State acting as the main force of judicial standing. It has two functions. Firstly act as the government’s legal and constitutional advisor. The example given by Robert Elgie is the 1989 request by Government over the issue of pupils wearing headscarves in schools[25]. Its second function is to act as the highest court of administrative court in France. In light of its increased workload, the Council was forced to adopt a new role through the formation of an Administrative Court of Appeal, of which 7 exist throughout France[26]. Underneath this is the Administrative Tribunal, of which 36 exist and are spread throughout France. With France’s increased involvement in the E.C., the Council of State recognised the supremacy of the E.C.J. over its national laws in 1989[27].Finally Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court is highly regarded. It has extensive jurisdiction and has a ‘powerful role[28]’ in the judiciary and law. Of its members eight are elected from the Bundstag and eight from the Bundstat. The criticism that Schmidt gives about this court is that it is very ‘reactive’ and not very ‘proactive’[29]. The main contrast that the German Federal Constitutional Court has is its refusal to give up its role as guardian of national laws and sees the ‘European integration subject to compatibility with fundamental norms of national law[30]’.

The expansion of the European Idea has had its influence on the development of new roles for executives, parliaments and courts. In the case of national Parliaments, national laws must be shown to the E.U. before their implementation. E.g. The Irish Minister for Health Michael Martin, this week sent off his proposals on the ‘smoking ban’ to the E.U. The extension of Europe has led to the setting up of a special office to deal with European issues in the Department of the Taoiseach in Ireland.

Similarly executives have adopted new roles through the Council of Ministers, which discuss the possibility of commonalities between member states, such as Trade and Common Currency. The European Central Bank’s upper limit of 3% of GNP of public spending generates increased economic discussion. The European Central Bank sets the interest rates for Europe and expects national central banks to follow suit. The growth of the European Court of Justice also has taken away a role for some national courts, leaving European law as supreme. However as seen this is not the case everywhere in Europe.

In conclusion, Parliaments, Executives and Courts have developed new roles, as it has been necessary such as the Administrative Court of Appeal in France, set-up in 1987. As already pointed out the process of European integration had led to an increase in new roles for Parliaments, Executives and Courts. However while the process of integration is generally a good thing, in this author’s view, much more could be done in order to improve the structure of the European Union. Thus by improving the structure, new roles will emerge which will give greater credibility to Parliaments, Executives and Courts.  

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

• Colomer, Joseph M. (2002) Political Institutions in Europe London: Routledge
• Elgie, Robert, (2003) Political Institutions in Contemporary France, Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Fysh, Peter and Wolfreys, Jim (2003) The Politics of racism in France (2e) Hampshire: Palgrave – Macmillan
  • Gallagher, Michael, Laver, M. and Mair, P., (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe; Institutions, Parties and Governments, London: Mc Graw Hill Inc.
• Heywood, Andrew (2002) Politics (2e) Hampshire: Palgrave
• Mény, Yves, Knapp, Andrew (1998) Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany (3e) Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Newton, Michael, Donaghy Peter J. (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain: A Political and Economic Guide Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Rhodes, Martin, Heywood Paul, Wright, Vincent (1997) Developments in West European Politics Hampshire: Palgrave- Macmillan
• Schmidt, Manfred G., (2003) Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Sweet, Alec Stone, Weiler, Joseph H H, (1998) The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence Oxford: Hart Publishing
• Wright, Vincent (1978) The Government and Politics of France Essex: The Anchor Press Ltd.

 

Articles

• Bruley, Anne-Marie, Mattli, Walter European before the Court: a Political Theory of Legal Integration from International Organization, Vol.47, No.1 (Winter 1993) pp41-76, accessed from http://links.jstor.org/sici? sici=0020-8183%28199324%2947%3A1%3AEBTCAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23 on 10/11/2003
• Saalfeld, Thomas Germany: From Dictatorship to Democracy in Parliamentary Affairs Vol.50 Number 3 July 1997 pp380-395
• Sala, V.Della Italy: A Bridge too far? in Parliamentary Affairs Vol.50 Number 3 July 1997 pp396-410
• Schmidt, Manfred G. Political Consequences of German Unification in West European Politics Vol. 15 October 1992 Number 4. pp1-15
• Stone, Alec In the Shadow of the Constitutional Council: The ‘Juridicisation’ of the Legislative Process in France in West European Politics Vol.12 April 1989 Number 2 pp 12-35
• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_May accessed 13/11/03

 

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[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_May accessed 13/11/03

[2] Manfred G. Schmidt (2003) Introduction in Political Institutions in Federal Republic of Germany

[3] Vincent Wright (1978) The Government and Politics of France pp109

[4] Ibid pp111

[5] Ibid pp111

[6] Manfred G. Schmidt (2003) Political Institutions in Federal Republic of Germany pp 96

[7] Michael Gallagher et al. (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe; Institutions, Parties and Governments Box 4-1 pp 80

[8] Michael Newton (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain; A Political and Economic Guide pp71

[9] Ibid pp61

[10] Ibid pp70

[11] Gallagher Op.cit pp80

[12] Michael Gallagher et al. (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe; Institutions, Parties and Governments Box 3-1 pp 52

[13] Gallagher Op.cit pp43

[14] Vincent Wright (1978) The Government and Politics of France pp27

[15] Manfred G. Schmidt (2003) Political Institutions in Federal Republic of Germany pp36

[16] Schmidt Op.cit pp29

[17] Michael Gallagher et al. (2001) Representative Government in Modern Europe; Institutions, Parties and Governments pp50

[18] Manfred Schmidt Political Consequences of German unification in West European Politics Vol.15, Oct 1992, Number 4 pp3

[19] Schmidt Op.cit pp12

[20] Peter Fysh and Jim Wolfreys (2003) The Politics of Racism in France (2e) pp43

[21] Michael Newton (1997) Institutions of Modern Spain; A Political and Economic Guide pp291

[22] Gallagher Op.cit Box 2-2 pp29

[23] Ibid pp29

[24] Robert Elgie (2003) Chapter 7-The Judiciary in Political Institutions in Contemporary France pp179

[25] Ibid pp192

[26] Ibid pp193

[27] Ibid pp194

[28] Manfred G. Schmidt (2003) Political Institutions in Federal Republic of Germany pp 127

[29] Manfred G. Schmidt (2003) Political Institutions in Federal Republic of Germany pp116

[30] Ibid pp127